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**From Insufficient to Dangerous:  
Changing Attitudes of Yugoslav Communists on the Concept  
of a *Historic Compromise* of the Italian Communist Party 1972-1980**

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the changes of the attitudes expressed by the leading Yugoslav communists about the concept of a historic compromise as defined by their Italian counterparts from 1972 to 1980. It aims at bringing these constantly evolving attitudes, closely related with the internal ideological changes within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in correlation with the gradual abandonment of the party policies adopted in the endeavor to influence the development of cooperation between Italian Communist Party and Christian Democracy. In order to position these changes in the adequate historical and social context, this paper relies on comparing results of the archival research with those that can be found within a wide spectrum of relevant literature from various fields of social science and humanities.

KEYWORDS: Historic compromise, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Italy, Josip Broz Tito, Enrico Berlinguer.

As Italy was going through the political crisis of the 1970s, The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) established new programs of financial aid in order to encourage further reforms of the Italian Communist Party policies. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) was continuously trying to create a new

political program in accordance with the newly adopted party ideology, Eurocommunism, and was subsequently drifting further away from the Soviet sphere of influence. When the electoral successes of 1976 opened the door for the Italian Communists to resume negotiations on cooperation with the faction of Christian Democracy led by Prime Minister Aldo Moro, Yugoslav leaders showed unprecedented enthusiasm towards the prospect of cooperation between the future Italian government and the PCI. However, after Moro's kidnapping and assassination brought negotiations between Christian Democracy and the Italian Communists to an end, the possibility of such collaboration materializing became far less likely. At the same time, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was going through its own internal process of ideological change, which could have effected a radical change in the LCY attitude towards the very concept of historic compromise between PCI and Christian Democracy.

### *Historic Compromise – Problems of Definitions and Perceptions*

When writing about new attitudes of the Italian communists in the early 70s, scholars have often used the term “historic compromise” (*compromesso storico*) in different contexts and with different definitions or presumed meanings. Authors engaged in political analysis most commonly used the term to define the series of negotiations between the Italian Communists and the fraction of Christian Democrats gathered around former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, from 1976 to 1978.<sup>1</sup> Historians and philosophers, on the other hand, frequently used the same term to indicate an entire series of new party policies of the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI) that were adopted during the early and mid-70s, aimed at fostering the future expansion of cooperation between the Italian communists and Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana*).<sup>2</sup> Christian Democracy was, at that time, the most popular

<sup>1</sup> Luigi Graziano, „The Historic Compromise and Constitutional Democracy: Towards a “New Democracy”?”, *International Political Science Review*, 3/1980, 345–368; Michael J. Sodaro, „The Italian Communists and the Politics of Auturity”, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 3/1980, 220–249; Hansjohob Stehle, „Italy between Compromise and Paralysis”, *The World Today*, 12/1979, 483–492.

<sup>2</sup> Rosario Forlenza, „A Party of Mezzogiorno: The Christian Democratic Party, Agrarian Reform and the Government of Italy”, *Contemporary European History*, 4/2010, 331–349; Stephen Gundle, „The PCI and the Historic Compromise”, *New Left Review*, 1/1987, 27–36.

and politically influential party in the country, which kept on forming different Italian governments with different coalition partners in the late 60s and through the political crisis of the 70s. After defining a new party ideology at XII Congress of PCI, held in Bologna during the February of 1969, Italian Communists were gradually becoming more open towards the new possibilities for developing closer cooperation with the ruling Christian Democracy.<sup>3</sup>

However, historians also frequently use the term “historic compromise” to describe policies that the PCI intended to adopt but never formally enacted, during the course of negotiations between General Secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, and Aldo Moro, a leading figure in one of the most influential fractions among the Christian Democrats at the time.<sup>4</sup> Recorded conversations between Italian and Yugoslav Communists show that, between the first months of 1977 up until the kidnapping and assassination of Moro in 1978, the Italian Communists themselves used the term historic compromise in a manner that would indicate an unfinished, and continuous process of reforming party policies in order to make them more compatible with those of Christian Democracy.<sup>5</sup> Also, some scholars use the term to describe numerous political concessions made by the PCI towards both the Socialist Party of Italy (PSI) and Christian Democracy from the early to the late 1970s, rather than the reforms of PCI policies and party ideology that were defined with a stated intent to ease the way towards further expanding cooperation between the PCI and Moro’s fraction of the Christian Democrats.<sup>6</sup>

The term historic compromise was first used in a series of articles written by Enrico Berlinguer in the early 1970s. In these articles, Berlinguer discussed the need of changing numerous aspects of PCI party policies in order to bring the political practice of the party further in line with the new

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<sup>3</sup> Silvio Pons, „The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism”, in *The Cambridge History of Cold War*, Vol.3, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–65.

<sup>4</sup> Luigi Graziano, „On Political Compromise: Italy after 1979 Elections”, *Government and Opposition*, 2/1980, 190–207; Palleggrino Nazzaro, „Order or Compromise in Italy?”, *Current History*, 2/1979, 172–183.

<sup>5</sup> Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), fond 507, Savez komunista Jugoslavije, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze IX, 48/I-513-556, Italija, Stenografske beleške razgovora sa predstavnicima Komunističke partije Italije, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Hellman, *Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of Historic Compromise in Turin, 1975-1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 207–209.

party ideology, as well as to create the necessary condition for expanding cooperation with Christian Democracy.<sup>7</sup> Italian press soon adopted the term and used in a rather widened sense, aiming to describe the entire ideological transition of the Italian Communist Party from a radical towards a more moderate, but still far-left political party, as well as all the political compromises made by the Italian communists towards all the parties of the center-left government. This included all the concessions made by Italian Communists in order to ease the tensions with the Socialist Party and pave the way for future cooperation between the two parties, were the principal rivals on the left of the Italian political spectrum.<sup>8</sup>

Despite writing extensive analyses regarding the phenomenon of historic compromise, the analysts from the Department of International Cooperation, tasked with advising members of LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) Central Committee on the current relations between political parties in Italy, rarely bothered to provide clear definitions of the term they grew accustomed to use frequently.<sup>9</sup> It can only be assumed, based on the wider context in which the term was most often used, that most of these authors used the term 'historic compromise' to briefly describe the Italian Communists' intention to develop cooperation with Christian Democracy, as well as all the efforts made in order to achieve that goal. These efforts included both policy changes adopted by the PCI, political concessions towards the government and extensive negotiations between representatives of the two largest political parties in Italy.<sup>10</sup>

A scholarly analysis of the common usage of other newly invented political terms at the time, such as "Eurocommunism" or the "New Left," shows that the contemporaries' tendency to attribute various, often shifting but interconnected meanings to the term "historic compromise" can be considered a

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<sup>7</sup> Valentine Lomellini, „The PCI and European Integration from Eurocommunism to Berlinguer's death", in *European political cultures and parties and the European integration process 1945–1992*, ed. by Lucia Bonfresci (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2015), 159–174.

<sup>8</sup> Alberto Chilosì, „The Long March of Italian Communists from Revolution to Neoliberalism", *Il Politico*, 1/2010, 99–120.

<sup>9</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-492, Izveštaji o značajnim stavovima Komunističke partije Italije, 1972–1974.

<sup>10</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-535, Informacije o konferenciji radničkih partija Evrope u Rimu, 1976.

characteristic feature of the era. In times of political crisis and swift changes of the social, economic, ideological and cultural landscape of most Mediterranean countries, inventing new terms to describe a new phenomenon became a common practice among journalists, politicians and intellectuals in the late 60s and early 70s.<sup>11</sup> Subsequently, various authors frequently used these new terms without investing enough time and effort to clearly define them or explain their origins, or properly emphasize the gradual change of the intended meaning they assigned to these terms in their works. Amidst the political turmoil of the time, newly coined political terms were often discarded as fast as they were constructed.<sup>12</sup> Recorded conversations between LCY and PCI representatives indicate that some contemporaries openly admitted that they are hardly able to follow the currents of the changes they viewed as “happening with unprecedented dynamic,” and utterly unable to analyze in detail the current political situation in Mediterranean countries before it radically changes again.<sup>13</sup>

### *Political and Social Context of the Historic Compromise*

In the two decades following the end of the Second World War, most Western European governments adopted a “welfare-state” economic model, which was marked by a constant expansion of social policies. To this day there are scholarly over the significance of the “red scare”, caused by the rising influence of both the Soviet Union and the Marxist parties within Western Bloc countries, in influencing Western governments to allow for a creation of what Italian communists defined as a “welfare-state circle.”<sup>14</sup> Most Western Bloc countries witnessed significant social changes caused by new social policies, and these changes were especially swift and radical in Italy after the country

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<sup>11</sup> Aurelie Andry, “Social Europe”, in *the long 1970-The story of a defeat* (Florence: European University Institute, 2019), 93–143.

<sup>12</sup> Arthur Lewis Caso, „The Production of New Scientific Terms”, *American Speech*, 2/1980, 101–111.

<sup>13</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-429, Razgovori vođeni tokom učešća jugoslovenske delegacije na XII kongresu KPI u Bolonji, 1969.

<sup>14</sup> Andre A. Sant’Ana and Leonard Weller, „The Threat of Communism during the Cold War: A Constraint to Social Inequality”, *Comparative Politics*, 3/2020, 359–381; Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey Stonecash, „The Threats of Communism, Socialism and Redistribution”, in *Polarization ant the Politics of Personal Responsibility* (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 91–109.

went through a period later referred to by historians as the age of the “economic miracle”. Deep structural changes within Western societies created conditions for new political movements, whose rising influence became apparent during the turmoil of the late 1960s. After a series of strikes and demonstrations in 1968 and 1969, many Western European countries experienced a long period of continuous political crisis.<sup>15</sup>

In Italy, the popularity and influence of the ruling center-left coalition was decreasing in the long aftermath of a global wave of student demonstrations, labor union strikes and massive protests that shook North America and Europe in 1968 and 1969. However, it should also be noted that some historians argue that it wasn't just the lack of a strong political alternative which preserved the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party in power. Ruling parties also showcased the ability to attract those voters that were previously critical towards the government, but were now motivated to grow less resentful towards governmental policies by the newly found fears and reactionary sentiments towards the emerging social phenomenon and cultural trends.<sup>16</sup> Italian communists formally adopted a new party ideology in 1969, which would later be referred to by the press as Eurocommunism, and the term would gradually be accepted by the PCI leadership itself.<sup>17</sup> In the years that followed, the Italian Communist Party went through a period of constant expansion of its influence on labor unions in Italy and its prestige among other European Marxist parties, while constantly improving their electoral performance, especially in local elections in some Italian provinces. At the same time, the PCI became increasingly willing to cooperate with the parties of the center-left government, the PSI and the DC, which could have been, among other factors, also influenced by the notion that rising political crisis is threatening the newly strengthened position of the Italian Communists.<sup>18</sup>

To this day, Italian scholars are debating to what extent were the main ideas expressed by Italian communists in their first conceptions about a future

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<sup>15</sup> Erik Hobsbaum, *Kraj kulture: Kultura i društvo u XX veku* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), 157–165, Niall Ferguson, *The Shock of the Global: The Seventies in Perspective* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 25–48.

<sup>16</sup> Edmondo Berselli, „The Crisis and Transformation of Italian Politics”, *Daedalus*, 3/2001, 2–24.

<sup>17</sup> Luka Filipović, *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968-1980* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2023), 61–73.

<sup>18</sup> Roberto Fornasier, „The DC and PCI in the Seventies: A Complex Relationship Supervised by the United States”, *Bulletin of Italian Politics*, 2/2012, 209–229.

“historic compromise” influenced by growingly complex and shifting international position of the PCI.<sup>19</sup> For example, the Chilean crisis of 1973 may have had a significant influence both on the direct decisions and the gradual development of ideological shifts later articulated by the party’s General Secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, and his closest associates.<sup>20</sup> Also, Italian Communists were caught in a seemingly constant cycle of distancing themselves and reapproaching Moscow for the better part of the decade, which also proved to be a point of criticism directed from the LCY towards the PCI towards the end of 1970s, as the Yugoslav Communists wanted their Italian counterparts to follow them on the path of slowly rebuilding relations with the Soviets that were damaged by the events of 1968.<sup>21</sup> Lastly, the Italian communist party needed to find a unique form of “compromise” between criticizing its governments foreign policies before their own voters and showcasing to their potential political allies within those same governments that they are no longer in agreement with the most influential communist parties of the Eastern Bloc in their stances about the major geopolitical developments.<sup>22</sup>

Documents from the Department of International Relations of the LCY confirm the hypothesis that the Italian Communists were hardly more certain about their future during the political crisis of the early 1970s than the Christian Democrats or Socialists.<sup>23</sup> Historians estimate that a number of influential Italian Communists partially predicted some of the new phenomena which would characterize the last decade of the “welfare state” in Europe.<sup>24</sup> Recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian Communists confirm

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<sup>19</sup> For a more detailed picture about the long-term process in which the new international role of PCI was forged alongside its new policies and ideological conceptions, see Lucio Magri, *The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism* (London: Verso books, 2019).

<sup>20</sup> Giorgio Napolitano, „The Italian Crisis: A Communist Perspective”, *Foreign Affaris*, 4/1978, 790–799 .

<sup>21</sup> Silvio Pons, „The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism”, in *The Cambridge Histroy of Cold War*. ed. M. P. Leffler and O. A. Westard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–65.

<sup>22</sup> Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *The History of Contemporary Italy 1943–2019* (Berlin: Springer Nature, 2022), 97–139.

<sup>23</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-492, Izveštaji o značajnim stavovima Komunističke partije Italije, 1972–1974.

<sup>24</sup> Silvio Pons, „Stalin, Togliatti and the Origins of Cold War in Europe”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2/2001, 3–27.

that Enrico Berlinguer, Gian Carlo Pajeta and Carlo Galluzzi openly shared with their Yugoslav counterparts their predictions that the “new age” in Italy will see the rise of both far-right and far-left terrorism, increase in all sorts of criminal activities, constant instability of governments and violent street clashes that would follow the ever growing number of protests and strikes.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the PCI was facing new competition on the far left of the Italian political spectrum. The early 1970s were marked by the substantial increment in popularity of the previously minor New Left or anarchist parties and movements in Italy, some of whom later fell under influence of neoliberal movements, while many others transformed into radical groups that became involved in acts of extremist violence.<sup>26</sup>

Already during the last months of 1971 and 1972, the Italian Communist Party published its first public calls for calming of social tensions that contained parts which later analysts recognized as statements of willingness to cooperate with the Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party in bringing the political crisis to an end.<sup>27</sup> In several discussions with LCY representatives on Italy’s social and political situation, the Italian Communists acknowledged that the PCI’s recent ideological shift gave them a unique opportunity to increase their negotiating leverage with both other political parties and the government.<sup>28</sup> Subsequent historical research indicates that Italian communists through the early 1970s indeed emphasized their devotion towards reforming the PCI’s policies when trying to initiate further negotiations about expanding cooperation with the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, and then went back to insisting on ideological puritanism whenever they felt like those same negotiations were taking an unfavorable turn.<sup>29</sup> Thus, it can be concluded that Italian communists deliberately leveraged their position between the radical and moderate left to advance their political objecti-

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<sup>25</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-424, Informacije o razgovoru L. Longa sa delegacijom SKJ, 30. decembar 1968. godine; AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-436-437, Analize razgovora sa Berlinguerom, Pajetom i Galucijem, 1969-1970. godina.

<sup>26</sup> Jovo Bakić, *Evropska krajnja desnica 1945-1980* (Beograd: Klio, 2019), 247–258.

<sup>27</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-514, Analiza društvene i političke situacije u Italiji, 1971. godine.

<sup>28</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-557, Materijali za pripremu SKJ delegacije koja će posetiti Italiju, 1973. godine.

<sup>29</sup> Donald Sassoon, *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party – From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 211–229.



ves, and that the political crisis worked in their favor in that regard. Consequently, it is no wonder that towards the end of 1972, the Yugoslav Communists urged their Italian counterparts to hurry up with concluding new formal agreements about expanding cooperation with the Socialist Party and Christian Democracy, stating that they shouldn't expect the period of unstable governments, known to be almost a "historical feature" of Italian politics, to last as long as it had in previous decades.<sup>30</sup>

*The Role of Yugoslav Communists in the Continuous  
Support for the Reformist Course of the PCI*

The gradual renewal of cooperation between Yugoslav and Italian Communists after 1956 and 1957 was marked by a slow but continuous growth in trust between the institutions of the two parties and the development of personal ties between their representatives.<sup>31</sup> Even when the leadership of the PCI first proposed conducting major reforms of party policies in the early 1960s, General Secretary Palmiro Togliatti and his closest associates remained somewhat critical towards the Yugoslav socialist model. At the time, leading Italian communists openly stated that the "Yugoslav way" of approaching the reformist tendencies was too radical and that it could never become a model for the reforms that Italian communists intend to achieve.<sup>32</sup> However, researchers have noticed a significant shift in the dominant attitudes of the leading Italian communists towards the course of LCY's reformist policies during the tenure of Luigi Longo and in the first years after Enrico Berlinguer became the General Secretary of the PCI.<sup>33</sup> A new generation of

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<sup>30</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-538, Informacije o razgovorima delegacija SKJ i KPI, 1972. godine.

<sup>31</sup> Saša Mišić, „Ne može se više ponoviti 1948. godina!; Jugoslavija i italijanski komunisti i socijalisti 1957-1962”, *Tokovi istorije*, 2/2022, 153–185, Саша Мишић, „Обнављање односа између Савеза комуниста Југославије и Комунистичке партије Италије 1955-1956. године”, *Токови историје*, 2/2013, 301–317.

<sup>32</sup> Bogdan Živković, „Inspiring Dissent: Yugoslavia and the Italian Communist Party during 1956”, *Токови историје* 3/2021, 171–198; Богдан Живковић, „Од новог помирења до стратешког савеза: односи југословенских и италијанских комуниста од 1962. године до Тољатијеве посете јануара 1964. године”, *Историјски записи* 3–4/2020, 121–146.

<sup>33</sup> Петар Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији? Погледи из Београда на Италију 1955–1975* (Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије, 2019), 41–59; Petar Dragišić, „The

Italian Marxists opted for a more thorough approach in reforming their party policies, and gradually became determined to steer their party ideology further away from the traditional adoption of core principles of the Soviet socialist model and closer to the positions on the ideological spectrum held by the LCY leadership in the late 1960s.<sup>34</sup>

From the first cautious mention of their reformist intentions up to the open conflict with the Soviet party in the aftermath of the 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia, Italian Communists enjoyed cordial support from their Yugoslav counterparts in almost all of their endeavors to adjust their party policies to the new social circumstances and to move away from the sphere of Marxist parties under Soviet influence. Already in 1967, during heated debates among the communist parties of Europe about the need to organize an international conference about the reformist tendencies in certain parties, LCY representatives promised Yugoslav financial support to the Italian Communists if the Soviet party decided to hold back financial aid to the PCI and other Western European parties with influential reformist fractions.<sup>35</sup> Soon after the Italian communists formally adopted a new party ideology at the 1969 Congress in Bologna, Yugoslav state and party institutions formally defined the programs of financial aid for the Communist Party of Italy. Beside the payments in money, which were previously, according to the established LCY practices, reserved only for other communist parties in exile, these programs included numerous other forms of aid, including paid vacations in Yugoslavia for leading Italian Communists, Yugoslav-provided medical care for impoverished party members, subsidies for film directors and artists connected to prominent PCI figures, funding for international seminars and conferences, and the publication of important works by Italian Marxist authors.<sup>36</sup>

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Yugoslav Perspective on Eurocommunism in the second half of the 1970s”, *Balkanica*, 1/2022, 301–317.

<sup>34</sup> Bogdan Živković, „Two last encounters between Broz and Berlinguer – the epilogue of an alliance”, *Balkanica*, 1/2022, 274–300; Luka Filipović, „Savez komunista Jugoslavije i XII Kongres Komunističke partije Italije 1969. godine – Počeci Trećeg puta socijalizma u Evropi”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2021, 135–152.

<sup>35</sup> Luka Filipović, „Finansijska politika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije prema komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke krajem šezdesetih godina 20. Veka”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2022, 477–494.

<sup>36</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-431, Preliminarna analiza dva predloga o pomoći člana direkcije KPI, Karla Galucija, 1969.

Different authors of the reports produced by the Department of International Relations within the Yugoslav party all agreed that the gradual drifting of Italian and other Mediterranean Marxists away from the Soviet sphere of influence is in accordance with the long-term interests of the Yugoslav communists within the sphere of relations of the major parties on the European far-left.<sup>37</sup> In terms of currents within the global community of communist parties, these authors relentlessly emphasized the importance of the fact that Italian communists seem to be setting a role model in accordance with which French, Spanish and Greek reformists are planning to reform the political practice and eventually, the ideology of their parties. This wave of reformist tendencies was considered significant for improving the already continuously rising international prestige of the Yugoslav party, since some of the oldest and symbolically important communist parties in the world could now appear in the eyes of an observer as if they are following the Yugoslav path of breaking with the Bolshevik doctrine in favor of an alternative socialist model.<sup>38</sup> Lastly, it was soon proven in practice that reformist policies are, to a certain extent, contributing towards the latest rise in popularity of Italian Communists during the times of turmoil and political crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yugoslav analysts employed by the League of Communists estimated that a further rise of communist influence in the Mediterranean countries would make it easier for the Yugoslav party to further increase its own influence on the European far-left, and subsequently, within the currents of the Western European politics.<sup>39</sup>

Consequently, Yugoslav Communists in the early 1970s were very vocal in their support of the expressed intentions of Italian Communists to make certain political concessions in order to achieve visible results in almost constantly outgoing negotiations about the expansion of cooperation with the Socialist Party of Italy and Christian Democracy. When Enrico Berlinguer started using the term “historic compromise” during his public speeches, the LCY was among the first Marxist parties in Europe that didn’t criticize the idea, but instead expressed its wholehearted endorsement of this new concept, whose me-

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<sup>37</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-430, U vezi traženja KPI da joj SKJ pruži materijalnu pomoć, 1969.

<sup>38</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-228, Izveštaj o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Francuske, 2. 5. 1969.

<sup>39</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-113, Analiza predloga o pomoći KPŠ, beleške sa sednice PB CK SKJ, 3. 5. 1972.

aning was still uncertain.<sup>40</sup> Recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian Communists show that there were moments when leading LCY figures, such as Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, and Stane Dolanc, appeared genuinely interested in how the concept of the “historic compromise” would influence future policymaking within the PCI.<sup>41</sup> From 1972 to 1974, and over the course of his increasingly frequent meetings with the General Secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito customarily inquired about the development in relations between Italian Communists and Christian Democracy.<sup>42</sup> In the same time period, the Socialist Alliance of Working People, a mass union organization under the influence of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, organized several group visits to Italy for prominent Communists and union leaders. Some of these delegations were scheduled to meet with representatives of the PCI, PSI and Christian Democracy at the same time, and were subsequently instructed to partake the role of mediators between the three fractions and to advocate for the expansion of cooperation between the three largest political parties in Italy.<sup>43</sup>

It is hard to measure the extent to which these and other similar attempts of Yugoslav Communists may have actually influenced the relations between the three major Italian parties, with all of whom the League of Communists of Yugoslavia maintained cooperation through the 1960s and 1970s. Yugoslav sources might have tended to exaggerate the scope of the Yugoslav influence in the Italian internal affairs, as scholarly analyses indicate the same tendency in sources produced by the LCY concerning the importance of Yugoslav communists in other aspects of global politics.<sup>44</sup> However, recorded

<sup>40</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-492, Izveštaji o značajnim stavovima Komunističke partije Italije, 1972–1974.

<sup>41</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-538, Informacije o razgovorima delegacija SKJ i KPI, 1972. godine.

<sup>42</sup> AJ, Fond 837, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, I-3-a/44-59-61, Izveštaji o prijemima i posetama generalnog sekretara KPI, Enrika Berlinguera, 1971–1974.

<sup>43</sup> AJ, Fond 142, Savez socijalističkog radnog naroda Jugoslavije, Međunarodna saradnja, A-074-078, Izveštaji o pripremama za organizaciju mediteranskih konferencija komunističkih partija Evrope, 1974–1978.

<sup>44</sup> Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat: Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita 1944–1964* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), 65–131; Nikola Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti 1950–1958* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2019), 20–25; Jovan Čavoški, „Za jedan pravedniji svet: Jugoslavija, nesvrstani i borba za Novi međunarodni ekonomski poredak 1973–1976”, *Tokovi istorije*, 2/2022, 217–248.

conversations between Yugoslav Communists and their Italian counterparts and the Department of International Relations' analytical reports make clear that the LCY leadership warmly supported PCI reforms aimed at expanding its cooperation with Christian Democracy.<sup>45</sup> Direction in which the LCY defined its programs of financial aid towards Italian Communists as well as documents produced by the Socialist Alliance of Working People indicate that from the early to mid-1970s, Yugoslav Communists remained committed to investing state resources in efforts to influence and improve relations between the Italian Communists and their key political rivals.<sup>46</sup> In addition, authors of the articles published in newspapers with close ties to the LCY insisted on the notion that Italian communists should reaffirm their devotion towards the principles of their new ideology by not just moving away from the isolationist traditions of their Bolshevik past, but also actively working on building a new political future in cooperation with socialists and Christian Democracy. Lastly, some of these authors even argued that initial compromises the Italian Communists made in order to renew and maintain negotiations about collaboration with the ruling parties could still be considered insufficient.<sup>47</sup>

### *A Compromise between Two Friends of Yugoslavia*

Numerous historians have stated that Aldo Moro, the head of the Democratic Initiative, one of the most influential fractions of Christian Democracy, had gained a reputation as a moderate conservative by the mid-1960s. While remaining opened towards a possibility of collaboration with different left-wing parties and movements, Moro championed the idea of a continuous expansion of "welfare-state" social policies.<sup>48</sup> During the early 1970s, he engaged in correspondence with the communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, which will, according to later scholarly analyses, gradually become more and more cordial as the two parties started facing similar challenges in an age marked by political crisis, rapid cultural changes and social turmoil. During his second term as Prime Minister of Italy from 1974 to 1976, Aldo Moro actively

<sup>45</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-438, Beleške razgovora V. Bakarića i S. Dolanca sa A. Kosutom, 1970.

<sup>46</sup> AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, Izveštaji o saradnji sa marksističkim partijama i sindikatima Mediterana, 1974–1978.

<sup>47</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-514, Analiza društvene i političke situacije u Italiji, 1971. godine.

<sup>48</sup> Hansjakob Stehle, „Italy's Problematic Stability”, *The World Today*, 1/1987, 12–15.

engaged in further strengthening close ties between Italy and Yugoslavia. Moro became rather well known among his Yugoslav contemporaries for his attempts at maintaining extraordinary level of trade and cultural exchange between the two countries, as well as in signing the Osimo Treaty, which finally settled remaining border disputes over the Trieste region.<sup>49</sup>

In 1968, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Italy displayed notable enthusiasm for the degree of sympathy that Aldo Moro and his faction of Christian Democracy appeared to show toward the Italian Communists during their conflict with the Soviet party.<sup>50</sup> Though at that time it was still early to speak about closer cooperation between the Christian Democracy and then still radical leftist party, Yugoslav Communists on several occasion advised their Italian counterparts to restrain from waging a “press war” against the Christian Democracy. On the one hand, Yugoslav communists were considering negotiations with Christian Democracy a useful way to pressure socialist to continue normalization of their relations with the PCI.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that LCY representatives, on several occasions during the late 1960s and early 1970s, have advocated for an especially careful approach towards Democratic Initiative. Some even went so far as to suggest that Moro would not feel constrained by any ideological dilemma if the Italian Communists were to assume, in his increasingly ambitious political plans, the role currently occupied by his ever-more demanding Socialist allies.<sup>52</sup> Finally, when Moro started publicly admitting that he is contemplating a formal agreement about cooperation between the government and the Italian Communist Party during his tenure as Prime Minister (1974-1976), leading Yugoslav communists urged their Italian counterparts to further expand on political concessions already made towards Christian Democracy in order to showcase their readiness to collaborate with the government.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Robin Wagner-Pacifici, „Negotiations in the Aldo Moro Affair: The Suppressed Alternative in a Case of Symbolic Politics”, *Politics & Society*, 4/1983, 487–517.

<sup>50</sup> Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSPRS), Politička arhiva (PA), Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove (SSIP), Fascikla 61, Italija 1968. godine, Izveštaji o stavovima i aktivnostima italijanskih komunista i socijalista.

<sup>51</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-514, Analiza društvene i političke situacije u Italiji, 1971. godine.

<sup>52</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-538, Informacije o razgovorima delegacija SKJ i KPI, 1972. godine.

<sup>53</sup> AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59-61, Izveštaji o posetama generalnog sekretara KPI, Enrika Berlinguera, 1971–1974.

However, scholarly analyses indicate that Moro did not devote serious attention to formulating a concrete plan for cooperation between Christian Democracy and the PCI until his own short-lived government collapsed amid political crisis, as did numerous unstable Italian governments before and after Moro's term in office.<sup>54</sup> It wasn't until the first months of 1977, when he was no longer Prime Minister, that Aldo Moro started meeting with Enrico Berlinguer more frequently and spending countless hours in devising plans for a renewal of a center-left government in Italy. What followed was a year of continuous three-way negotiations between the PCI, PSI and Democratic Initiative, which occupied the attention of the media, since neither of the three sides appeared to be keen on keeping most of the details from their talks behind the close doors of cabinets and party offices.<sup>55</sup> From the outset of these negotiations, analysts in the LCY Department of International Relations judged that the Italian Communists had only a slim chance of joining the new government. They predicted that the new Italian government, still only vaguely envisioned by Moro and Berlinguer themselves, will be constructed only from the members of the PCS and Christian Democracy, while the Communists would remain supporting the government from the outside.<sup>56</sup> Researchers later produced evidence that suggest the assessments made by Yugoslav communists were at least partially correct. Posthumously published writings by Moro, Berlinguer, and their close associates indicate that the defining feature of the envisioned government was to be an unprecedented level of cooperation with the PCI, seen as essential for achieving and maintaining long-awaited political stability. The Communist Party would formally stay outside the government, but would receive a hefty compensation for its collaboration through participation in various state institutions and a new set of privileges for the labor unions under its influence.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Diego D'Amelio, „Peace in Security and the Bridge Border: The Italian Centre-Left and Yugoslavia in resolving the question of Trieste”, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 1/2015, 117–141.

<sup>55</sup> Petar Dragišić, „Jugoslovenski izvori o otmici i ubistvu Alda Mora”, *Tokovi istorije*, 1/2013, 351–368.

<sup>56</sup> AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, Izveštaji o saradnji sa marksističkim partijama i sindikatima Mediterana, 1974–1978.

<sup>57</sup> Martin Bull, „The Italian Communist Party in the 1980s and the denouement of the Italian party system”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 2/2023, 176–190.

The Yugoslav party at first supported the compromising course of the PCI, despite their correct assumptions that *de jure* participation in the government wasn't likely to appear on the negotiating table as an option for the Italian communists, and the lack of reliable information on whether the PCI would accept *de facto* participation through close collaboration with the government.<sup>58</sup> Recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian Communists show that, at the beginning of 1977, Yugoslav Communists urged their Italian counterparts not only to accept any offer Moro was about to present to them, but to continue reforming their party policies and making political concessions towards Christian Democracy regardless of the outcome of negotiations.<sup>59</sup> However, the first "cracks" in Yugoslav thus far cordial and unconditional support for the internal reforms and political compromises of the PCI began to show during the summer of the same year, immediately after the "great summit" of Eurocommunist leaders in Madrid. Yugoslav Communists judged that, despite frequent correspondence and personal friendships with their Yugoslav counterparts, the PCI leadership collectively failed to provide what they considered sufficient details about the discussions held between Italian, Spanish, and French communist leaders in Madrid.<sup>60</sup> The authors of the reports commissioned by the LCY Department for International Relations were not satisfied by merely questioning the sincerity of the PCI leadership towards their Yugoslav counterparts. They suggested that the LCY leadership assess the extent to which this "betrayal of trust" may have been shaped by years of gradual internal reforms within the PCI and the development of Eurocommunist ideology.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, members of the LCY Ideological Commission started raising concerns about perceived tendencies of PCI leaders to mimic the behavior and even manner in which they expressed some attitudes that were previously considered to represent a typical pattern for centrist political parties.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-565-688, Izveštaji o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1977-1980.

<sup>59</sup> AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Informacije o pripremama za konferenciju KP Evrope u Berlinu, 1976. godine.

<sup>60</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-571-578, Programi razvoja saradnje sa KPI za 1977 i 1978. godinu.

<sup>61</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-535, Informacije o organizaciji konferencije KP Evrope u Rimu, 1977. godine.

<sup>62</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-560-571, Materijali o poseti delegacije SKJ Italiji 1977. godine.



Yugoslav support for further expansion of cooperation between Italian Communists and their political rivals didn't appear to have been critically shaken by suspicions that Italian communists were moving dangerously away from their communist roots, and subsequently their closest international communist allies, while trying to materialize the concept of a "historic compromise" with Christian Democracy. Newspapers published by the LCY still enthusiastically wrote about the expected formation of a political alliance between the "two friends of Yugoslavia", while Josip Broz Tito continued to urge Enrico Berlinguer to invest more time and resources into developing closer professional and personal relationship with Aldo Moro.<sup>63</sup> By late 1977 and 1978, the authors of the Department of International Relations' reports appeared to have forgotten their earlier concerns about the impact of close cooperation between Italian Communists and the Democratic Initiative on LCY-PCI relations. Only a few months after they have been vocal about the suspected "signs of distancing" towards the LCY showed by the PCI, the same analysts wrote new propositions on how the Yugoslav party could leverage its unshaken cooperation with Christian Democracy in order to aid Italian communists in their negotiations with Moro and his supporters.<sup>64</sup> Subsequently, it can be concluded that initial doubts of Yugoslav Communists about the potential negative outcomes of the still not formally defined "historic compromise" shouldn't be considered as a beginning, but rather as a foreshadowing of a gradual shift in dominant LCY attitudes towards internal Italian affairs that was slowly taking a shape.

*Yugoslav Disapproval for the Concept of Historic Compromise  
after the Death of Moro*

The kidnapping and death of Aldo Moro in the spring of 1978 had formally put an end to negotiations about direct or indirect participation of the PCI in a new government that was about to be constituted by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. These negotiations exemplify what political scientists typically regard as the clearest expression of the concept of the historic compromise. However, the readiness of the two parties to continue their co-

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<sup>63</sup> AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Informacije o razgovorima vođenim između J. B. Tita i E. Berlinguera tokom konferencije RP Evrope u Berlinu, 1976. godine.

<sup>64</sup> AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, Međunarodna saradnja, Izveštaji o pripremama mediteranskih konferencija 1974-1978.

operation didn't die with Moro's dream of a great coalition government, and neither did those changes in political practice of the Italian communists that were implemented with the stated purpose to make it possible for the PCI and Christian Democracy to continue improving their relations.<sup>65</sup> Those new sets of PCI reformist policies, that numerous other Marxists parties of Europe denounced as a "historic compromise of the Italian communists," continued to expand, though at a much slower pace, in the months following Aldo Moro's death. On the other hand, Yugoslav Communists were starting to openly show animosities towards the same inclinations of Italian Communists to appease Christian Democracy they had once fervently supported.<sup>66</sup>

Just weeks after the kidnapping and death of Moro, the LCY Department of International Relations reports were showing signs of concern about determination with which Enrico Berlinguer and his associates spoke about helping the government in its efforts to arrest and prosecute the alleged perpetrators of Moro's assassination, members of the far-left organization, the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*). Yugoslav Communists were worried that the media outrage against the terrorist organization could spiral into an all-out crusade against all radical left parties and movements, and that Italian communists could find themselves at a forefront of revanchist movement directed at some of their old political allies.<sup>67</sup> During their meetings with the representatives of the PCI leadership, Yugoslav Communists tried to subtly convey to their Italian counterparts that continuation of their active support for police crackdowns on the suspected quarters of other radical left organizations other than the Red Brigades could damage the prestige of the Italian communists within international associations of Marxist parties.<sup>68</sup> Even more worrisome for the leading Yugoslav Communists was a sense of defeatism that the Italian Communist party suffered in the aftermath of turbulent events after the death of Moro at the beginning of the last phase in the Italian "Years of Lead".<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Geoffrey Pridham, „The Italian Christian Democrats after Moro – crisis or compromise?“, *West European Politics*, 2/1979, 69–88.

<sup>66</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-565-688, Izveštaji o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1977–1980.

<sup>67</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-571-578, Programi razvoja saradnje sa KPI za 1977 i 1978. godinu.

<sup>68</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-591-597, Analiza prepiske partijskih odeljenja SKJ i KPI, 1978.

<sup>69</sup> A time in Italian history from 1969 to 1985 marked by a continuous string of political assassinations, kidnappings and street violence between the groups of far-left and far-

This was, however, just a beginning of the period during which the attitudes of the Yugoslav party towards the idea of maintaining those PCI policies that were defined in accordance with the concept of historic compromise would gradually become more and more critical. By the final months of 1978, LCY analysts began formulating various hypotheses to explain why the PCI continued offering new concessions to Christian Democracy even after it had become clear that Moro's vision of a stable government involving the Italian Communists would never materialize.<sup>70</sup> As communication between Yugoslav and Italian Communists noticeably declined in both frequency and cordiality during 1979, Yugoslav Communists began openly asking PCI representatives when the party leadership intended to resume its previously abandoned strategy of boosting political support through more radical criticism of the government.<sup>71</sup> When heated debates threatened to endanger the cooperation between Italian Communists and Socialists in 1980, Yugoslav Communists opted to support the communist side in the conflict with the Socialists, with whom the LCY still maintained close cooperation.<sup>72</sup> Just weeks before the death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980, members of the Department of International Relations wrote that they found it difficult to understand why the Italian Communists still seemed reluctant to attack Christian Democracy with the same intensity they directed toward the Socialists.<sup>73</sup>

*Seemingly Sudden Change of Heart in the Shadow  
of a Long Historical Process*

When Enrico Berlinguer finally proclaimed the "era of historic compromise" to be over in the late 1980, he received passionate support from the leadership of the LCY, which was at the time comprised by some of the same people who stood beside Josip Broz Tito a few years earlier, when he was encouraging

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right extremists (John Foot, „Years of Lead; Memory, History, Journalism, Victims”, *Modern Italy*, 3/2023, 1–8).

<sup>70</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-588, Informacije o društvenoj i političkoj situaciji u Italiji, 1978.

<sup>71</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-590-633, Izveštaji o susretima delegacija SKJ i KPI, 1979 i 1980. godine.

<sup>72</sup> DAMSPRS, PA, SSIP, Fascikla 61, Italija 1980. godine, Informacije o aktivnostima italijanskih komunista.

<sup>73</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-612, Podsetnik o razvoju društvene i političke situacije u Italiji, 1980. godine.

Berlinguer to do whatever is necessary to preserve the recently acquired improvements in relations of PCI with both the Socialists and Christian Democracy. It doesn't seem that a gradual fallout between Yugoslav and Italian governments could serve as a sufficient explanation for this change of the dominant attitude of the Yugoslav communists towards the concept of historic compromise.<sup>74</sup> Though the dynamics of previously cordial relations between the governments of the two countries and their fertile trade was gradually beginning to slow down towards the end of Tito's presidency, sources left by the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Italy testify that almost traditional closeness between the two countries was still maintained at least to a certain degree.<sup>75</sup> That same year, Alessandro Pertini's new Socialist administration made substantial efforts to improve both Yugoslav–Italian governmental relations and ties between the LCY and the PSI.<sup>76</sup> Still, Yugoslav Communists fully supported the newly radicalized stances of Italian Communists towards the Socialists, despite the fact that it could be hardly claimed that a restarted conflict between the PCI and the Socialists was in best interest of either Yugoslav or Italian communists.<sup>77</sup>

By late 1980, reports from the Department of International Relations routinely criticized the Italian Communists for attacking the Christian Democrats less forcefully in the media than they did the representatives of the Italian Socialist Party.<sup>78</sup> During the brief meetings held between LCY and PCI delegations in the early 1980s, Yugoslav Communists repeatedly remarked that they had finally abandoned their earlier fears that the PCI would persist in what they now characterized as a “dangerously compromising” attitude toward Christian Democracy.<sup>79</sup> Numerous factors could have influenced the process during

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<sup>74</sup> For more information on the development of relations and trade between Yugoslavia and Italy, see: Ognjen Tomić, „Examples of informal practices in Yugoslavia's trade relations with Italy in the 1960s and 1970s”, *Tokovi istorije*, 3/2022, 175–198.

<sup>75</sup> DAMSPRS, PA, SSIP, Fascikla 61, Italija 1980. godine, Informacije o saradnji sa političkim partijama u Italiji.

<sup>76</sup> Borut Klabjan, „Twinning across the Adriatic: history, memory and municipal cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia during the Cold War”, *Urban History*, 4/2024, 763–776.

<sup>77</sup> DAMSPRS, PA, SSIP, Fascikla 61, Italija 1980. godine, Informacije o aktivnostima italijanskih komunista.

<sup>78</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-612, Podsetnik o razvoju društvene i političke situacije u Italiji, 1980. godine.

<sup>79</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-565-688, Izveštaji o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1977–1980.

which, in the dominant perceptions of LCY leadership, expansion of cooperation between the PCI and Christian Democracy went through being a desired outcome, even worthy of investing financial means of Yugoslav state into its accomplishment, towards becoming a dangerous precedent. One of the potential factors that could have influenced such a radical change of the attitude of Yugoslav Communists about the concept of a historic compromise could be an ideological change that was occurring within the Yugoslav party itself. Even during the mid-1970s, when Yugoslav Communists openly supported Italian Communists in their endeavors to enhance cooperation between the PCI, the Socialists and Christian Democracy in Italy, the Yugoslav party was already shifting away from its reformist course of the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>80</sup>

After the turbulent events involving protests, insurrections and internal party struggles from 1972 to 1974, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia started to gradually abandon its reformist policies and to slowly reestablish more authoritarian mechanisms of governing the state.<sup>81</sup> During these years, the number of arrests and trials of both right- and left-wing dissidents steadily increased, accompanied by the introduction of new disciplinary measures and expanded censorship practices.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, the LCY conducted a reconstruction of its own ideological commissions, which in itself can, to a certain extent, indicate the new direction in which the development of party ideology would continue. Commission for Democratization was replaced with the Commission for Ideological Education, thus somewhat confirming suspicions of some Yugoslav contemporaries that the informal doctrine of debate and dialogue would soon be replaced by ideological indoctrination.<sup>83</sup> Documents of the State Security Service testify

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<sup>80</sup> Bojan Dimitrijević i Luka Filipović, *Anarholiberalizam: Ideologija i služba 1967-1980* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2024), 361–367.

<sup>81</sup> For more on this long and complex process, see: Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988); Bojan Dimitrijević, *Ранковић – Друџи човек* (Београд: Вукотић Медиа, 2020), Milivoj Bešlin, *Ideja moderne Srbije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2023); Latinka Perović, *Dominantna i neželjena elita: Beleške o intelektualnoj i političkoj eliti u Srbiji XIX-XX vek* (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2015); Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija, struktura raspredanja* (Beograd: Rad, 1990).

<sup>82</sup> Luka Filipović, „Kontradiktorne politike SKJ prema pobunama u Jugoslaviji i u Evropi 1968”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2024, 433–452.

<sup>83</sup> Arhiv Srbije (AS), fond CK Saveza komunista Srbije, Ideološke komisije, 121, Komisija za aktivnost na daljoj demokratizaciji društveno političkog života, 1968–1972. godine;

that the Yugoslav state was constantly increasing its efforts to conduct surveillance of the potential opposition from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. These sources testify that, from the mid to late 1970s, several court cases were reopened against individuals suspected of various, often trivial offenses committed during the 1968 student demonstrations.<sup>84</sup> All of these factors indicate that the LCY was, even at the time in which it still openly supported the PCI in its efforts to take a more tolerant and compromising attitude towards its political opponents, slowly returning to the radical and uncompromising practices of its past.

Over the years, the Department of International Relations reports became more and more critical towards the new ideology of Italian Communists, Eurocommunism, which provided the ideological justification for participating in creation of the concept of a historic compromise. Towards the end of 1970s, some of the same analysts who enthusiastically wrote about how adoption of the new PCI ideology opened up many doors for Italian Communists to expand their cooperation with other political parties in Italy, now started to question if the PCI reforms went too far, and question the compromising attitudes towards the PSI and Christian Democracy.<sup>85</sup> At the same time, Yugoslav Communists began openly trying to contribute towards repairing the relations between Italian Communists and the ruling parties of the Eastern Bloc countries, which were becoming growingly distant as reformist policies of the PCI continuously expanded. By the end of the decade, analysts advising the LCY leadership started to propose financing and organizing meetings between PCI representatives and members of the Soviet, Polish or East German parties.<sup>86</sup> This stood in sharp contrast to the LCY's actions nearly a decade earlier, when it introduced its first policies of financial aid to the Italian Communists to help them distance themselves from the Eastern Bloc parties. Justifications for such a radical change of attitudes offered by the documents produced in LCY party offices tend to avo-

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AS, fond CK Saveza komunista Srbije, Ideološke komisije, 144, Komisija za ideološko usmeravanje i edukaciju, 1972–1974. godine.

<sup>84</sup> AS, fond BIA, fascicle I-VIII, Informacije o procesuiranju osumnjičenih za učešće u izgedima tokom studentskih demonstracija 1968. godine.

<sup>85</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-565-688, Izveštaji o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1977–1980.

<sup>86</sup> AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, Međunarodna saradnja, Izveštaji o pripremama mediteranskih konferencija 1974–1978.

id discussing the interests of Yugoslav state or of the Party, while focusing on the ideological reasons for supporting renewal of cooperation between the PCI and the Soviet party. The Department of International Relations reports claim that dominant stances within the PCI have become surprisingly and dangerously deradicalizing for a communist party and that further expansion of its compromising policies could endanger what they perceive as a “common cause” of all the Marxist in both East and West. This was precisely the same rhetorical constructions the Soviet party used when criticizing reforms conducted by the PCI in 1968.<sup>87</sup>

Although various other factors may have influenced the gradual change of the LCY attitude towards the concept of historic compromise and reformist policies of PCI in general, the ideological factor emphasized in the sources produced by Yugoslav communists indicates that an important change occurred within the Yugoslav party during 1970s. From the ideological point of view, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at the end of the decade wasn't the same party which was, during the early years of political crisis in Italy, ready to invest time and resources into supporting cooperation between Italian communists and Christian Democracy. In perceptions of the leading Yugoslav communists, it took less than a decade for the concept of historic compromise to evolve dramatically. During this period, historic compromise had grown from the glorified monument of successful Marxist reformism in political practice into a worrisome reminder that a more tolerant and cooperative approach could cause a communist party to become indistinguishable, in terms of political practice, from the socialist or left-wing liberal parties.

#### SUMMARY

The positions of the Yugoslav communists on the cooperation between the Italian Communist Party and the Christian Democrats changed radically during the period from 1972 to 1980. At the same time, the implicit framework of the concept of historical compromise – a central idea in the plans for cooperation between the Italian communists and the Christian Democrats – also shifted. The consequences of the second political crisis, along with new social and cultural phenomena of the late 1960s and early 1970s, altered the political positions of

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<sup>87</sup> AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-633-636, Analiza prepiske sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1980. godine.

Italy's two largest parties and their views on the possibilities for achieving or expanding compromise. Significant changes also occurred in the party ideology of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. These ideological shifts, along with other factors, may have contributed to changes in the dominant perceptions among Yugoslav communists regarding the programs of historical compromise and their own participation in their implementation. At the beginning of the decade, the Yugoslav party was prepared to define financial assistance programs to influence the development of political factors in Italy. By the end of the decade, however, it had almost completely abandoned such efforts and, to some extent, its interest in the outcome of the political crisis in Italy. Meanwhile, Yugoslav communists developed critical attitudes toward the idea of Italian communists collaborating with moderate left- or right-wing parties in Western Europe, and instead sought to act as mediators in bringing Italian communists back into alignment with the ruling parties of the Eastern Bloc.

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## Резиме

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### ОД НЕДОВОЉНОГ ОД ОПАСНОГ: ПРОМЕНЉИВИ СТАВОВИ ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКИХ КОМУНИСТА О КОНЦЕПТУ ИСТОРИЈСКОГ КОМПРОМИСА КОМУНИСТИЧКЕ ПАРТИЈЕ ИТАЛИЈЕ 1972–1980

АПСТРАКТ: Овај чланак бави се променама у ставовима водећих југословенских комуниста о концепту историјског компромиса који су дефинисали италијански комунисти у периоду 1972–1980. године. Текст је настао са циљем да доведе ове промене ставова, које су биле у вези са дубоким унутрашњим променама партијске идеологије Савеза комуниста Југославије, у везу

са постепеним напуштањем оних политика које је југословенска партија установила са циљем да утиче на развој сарадње Комунистичке партије Италије и Хришћанске демократије. Како би се ове промене поставиле у одговарајући историјски и друштвени контекст, овај чланак ослања се на упоређивање резултата архивског истраживања са резултатима истраживања која чине део коришћеног скупа релевантне научне литературе из различитих области друштвених и хуманистичких наука.

КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ: Историјски компромис, Савез комуниста Југославије, Комунистичка партија Италије, Јосип Броз Тито, Ен-рико Берлингуер.

Ставови југословенских комуниста о сарадњи Комунистичке партије Италије са Хришћанском демократијом радикално су се променили у историјском периоду 1972–1980. године. Истовремено, мењали су се и подразумевани оквири значења самог појма историјског компромиса, који је био централни концепт у плановима о сарадњи италијанских комуниста и демохришћана. Суочавање са последицама друге политичке кризе, као и са новим друштвеним и културним феноменима касних шездесетих и раних седамдесетих година, мењало је политичке позиције двеју највећих политичких партија у Италији, као и њихове ставове о могућностима постизања или проширивања компромиса. У исто време, дошло је до значајних промена саме партијске идеологије Савеза комуниста Југославије. Ове идеолошке промене могле су, уз бројне друге факторе, допринети промени доминантних перцепција југословенских комуниста о програмима историјског компромиса и властитом учешћу у њиховој реализацији. Југословенска партија, која је почетком деценије била спремна да дефинише програме финансијске помоћи како би покушала да утиче на развој односа политичких фактора у Италији, крајем исте деценије готово у потпуности напушта овакве покушаје и, у извесној мери, интересовање за исход политичке кризе у Италији. Истовремено, југословенски комунисти развили су критичке ставове према самој идеји о сарадњи италијанских комуниста са партијама умерене леве или деснице у Западној Европи, и уместо тога покушавали да играју улогу посредника при поновном зближавању италијанских комуниста са владајућим партијама Источног блока.